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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-----0000000-----

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Appellant - Plaintiff,
vs.
WESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Respondent - Defendant.
-----0000000-----

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
-----0000000-----

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff - appellant, National
Fanners Union Property and Casualty Company, against the de~endant respondent, Western Casualty and Surety Company, under a theory of
equitable and conventional subrogation and/or contribution, to recover
proportionate share of monies paid in settlement of a tort claim.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
There being no real dispute as to the facts of this case,
both parties made Motions for Summary Judgment and filed Memorandnms uf Points and Authorities with respect thereto.
:,- ' ' '

1

by

Both Motions were

Judge Dean E. Conder on the 9th day of June, 1977.

Based
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upon the written and oral arguments, the Court ordered that appellant!
Motion for Summary Judgment be denied and that respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment be granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Order granting respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying appellant's Motion for
Summary Judgment set aside and further seeks a Judgment in its favo:
and against the respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant issued a General Liability-Automobile Policy
No. E42-6016A to Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse providing fo1
bodily injury limits of $50, 000. 00 per person and $100, 000. 00 per
occurrence subject to the applicable limit per person and that said
policy was in force and effect on June 15, 1972.
Respondent issued a Homeowners Policy No. CH 94 70 59
to Brent G. Story & Ila S. Story providing for bodily injury and ~iabilil!

cove~age of $25, 000. 00 per occurrence and medical payments to other:
of $500. 00 per person and said policy of insurance was in force and
effect on June 15, 1972.
At all times material herein, Brent G. Story was the
Captain of the Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse and in that
capacity had the right to control and did in fact control the members
of said Posse and had overall general supervision of the conduct oft\'
members of the Posse at all practice drills and parades and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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olliec

performances.
On June 15, 1972, the Weber County Sheriff's Mounted
Posse was conducting a practice drill on its grounds near Harrisville,
Weber County, State of Utah.

At that time, Brent G. Story was

present and functioning in his capacity as Captain of the Weber County
Sheriff's Mounted Posse.

Some of the Posse members had completed

the drill, but others were still in the process of drilling at 9:30 P. M.
when one of the horses owned by Afton LeRoy Cheney escaped from
the grounds, ran through an open gate on to the highway and was there
struck by a motor vehicle in which Arthur E. Haggen, Jr. was riding
as a passenger,
As a result of that collision, Arthur E. Haggen, Jr, was
permanently paralyzed from the neck down.

Arthur E. Haggen, Jr.

filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Weber County naming, among
others, as defendants Afton LeRoy Cheney, Brent G. Story and the
Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse.

The case was settled for the

sum 'of $50, 000. 00.
Based upon the amount prayed for by Arthur E. Haggen, Jr,
in his Complaint, and the insurance policy limits of the Weber County
Sheriff's Mounted Posse, Afton LeRoy Cheney and Brent G. Story, the
Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse was to pay fifty percent (50%)
of the settlement or $25, 000, 00, Afton LeRoy Cheney was to pay twentyfivc percent (25%) of the settlement or $12, 500. 00 and Brent G, Story
1
' '

ui

pay twenty-five percent (25o/o) of the settlement or $12, 500, 00.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, appellant, the
insurance carrier for the ·weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse,
paid Arthur E. Haggen, Jr. $50, 000. 00.

Subsequently, appellant has

recovered $12, 500. 00 from the insurance carrier of Afton LeRoy Che:
representing his pro rata share.

However, the respondent, the insura·

carrier of Brent G. Story, has not, as yet, paid its proportionate sha:
to the appellant.
Coverage under either insurance policy is not in dispute.
The question is one of determining the relative liability of two insuram
companies providing concurrent coverage for the same loss,

The

"pro rata liability" provision of Brent G. Story's insurance policy with
respondent reads:
This Company shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of any loss than the amount hereby
insured shall bear to the whole insurance covering the property against the peril involved,
whether collectible or not.
The "other insurance" provision of Weber County Sheriff's Mounted
Poss'e•s insurance policy with appellant reads:
The insurance afforded by this policy is primary
insurance, except when stated to apply in excess
of or contingent upon the absence of other
insurance. vVhen this insurance is primary and
the insured has other insurance which is stated
to be applicable to the loss on an excess or contingent basis, the amount of the company's
liability under this policy shall not be reduced
by the existence of such other insurance.
When both this insurance and other insuran~
apply to the loss on the same basis, whe~
mary, excess or contingent, the compan_y !J1Jll
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not be liable under this policy for a greater
proportion of the loss than that stated in the
applicable contribution provision below:

(b) Contribution by Limits. If any of such
other insurance does not provide for contribution
by equal shares, the company shall not be liable
for a greater proportion of such loss than the
applicable limit of liability under this policy for
!;!uch loss bears to the total applicable limit of
liability of all valid and collectible insurance
against such loss. [Emphasis added.]

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I
WHERE THERE IS CONCURRENT INSURANCE
COVERAGE AND THE "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE
OF ONE LIABILITY POLICY CONFLICTS WITH A
SIMILAR CLAUSE OF THE OTHER LIABILITY POLICY,
REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAUSE,
THE CLAUSES ARE MUTUALLY REPUGNANT
AND THE INSURERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO
SHARE THE LOSS IN PROPORTION TO THE
LIMITS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POLICIES,
Generally "other insurance" clauses take one of the following three forms:

(1) Pro rata clauses which provide that the insurer

will be liable only for a pro rata share of the loss, usually in proportion
to the limits of liability of its policy in relation to the limits of liability
of all other valid and collectible insurance;l (2) excess clauses which

1.

See:

Lamb- Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore.

! 10, 118, 341 P. Zd 110, 114 (1959):

II the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this
\'ulu: 1 the Company shall not be liable under this policy for a
! l _,,ter proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of lia'"
. . . bears to the total applicable limit of all valid and
- 01 Sponsored
lc:c tible
. Funding
. . for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
by theinsurance.
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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provide that the insurer will be liable for any loss which exceeds the
limits of liability of all other valid and collectible insurance;Z and (lJ
escape clauses which provide that the policy affords no coverage if
other insurance is available. 3

In addition, some policies contain co 11 .

binations of the above types: to wit, (1) escape-excess which provide;
that if other valid and collectible insurance covering a specific loss
exists then the insurer will be liable only for any loss which exceeds
the limits of liability of said other specific, valid and collectible
insurance;4 (2) pro rata-escape which provide that the insurer will be
liable only for a pro rata share of the loss under certain conditions ani

that the policy affords no coverage if other valid and collectible insurac

2. Id. at 118, 341 P. 2d at 114: "If the Insured's liability under
this policyis covered by any other valid and collectable insurance, the:
this policy shall act as excess insurance over and above such other
insurance. "
3. See: New Amsterdam Gas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Ind~
Co., 18 F.Supp. 707, 709 (W.D. Ky. 1937):
- - If any other As sured included in this insurance is covered by valiG
and collectable insurance against a claim also covered by this
Policy, he shall not be entitled to protection under this Policy.
See: Insurance Co. of Texas v. Employers Liab. Assur~
163 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S. D. Cal. 1958):
.
If other valid insurance exists protecting the insured from l!a- .
bility for such bodily injury • • • or destruction of property, t~;
policy shall be null and void with respect to such specific haza:a
otherwise cove red, whether the insured is specifically named in
.
h owever, th a t 1. f th e applicab.t1,
such other policy or not; provided,
limit of liability of this policy exceeds the applicable limit of succ
other valid insurance, then this policy shall apply as excess 1
ltcc '
insurance against such hazard in an amount equal to the app
limit of liability of this policy minus the applicable limit of b
bility of such other insurance.
4.

~,
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.,

is available under other conditions;5 and (3) pro rata-excess which
provides that under certain conditions the insurer will be liable only
for a pro rata share of the loss, while under other conditions, the
insurer will be liable for any loss which exceeds the limits of liability
of all other valid and collectible insurance. 6
The principle case presents one of the most common
situations where concurrent insurance coverage e:xists and there is a
conflict between the "other insurance" clauses.

Respondent's "other

insurance" clause is one of the pure pro rata types which provides that
the insurer will be liable only for a pro rata share of the loss.

On the

other hand, appellant's "other insurance" clause seems to be of the
"primary-pro rata" variety which provides primary insurance unless
other valid and collectible insurance applies to the loss on the same

5.

See: New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.

~' 18 F. Supp. 707, 709 (W. D. Ky. 1937):

If the named Assured carries any other Insurance covering concur-

!ently a claim covered by this Policy, he shall not recover'from the
Company a larger proportion of any such claim than the sum hereby
insured bears to the whole amount of valid and collectable concurrent
insurance. If any other Assured included in this insurance is covered
by valid and collectable insurance against a claim also covered by
this Policy, he shall not be entitled to protection under this Policy.

6. Allstate Ins. Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc., 312 F. Supp.
1386 (N. D. Ind. 1970)
If there is other insurance • • •
Allstate shall not be liable under this Part I [bodily injury and property
damage} for a greater proportion of any loss than the applicable limit
of liability stated on the Supplement Page bears to the total applicable
linii.t oJ liability of all collectible insurance against such loss; proi·irled, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute
'·'· 1 tornobile or a non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over
''"\' other collectible insurance.
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basis in which event the insurer will be liable only for a pro rata share
of the loss.
Initially, several theories were used to resolve the conflicting "other insurance" clause problem.

Out of property law concepts,

courts developed the "prior-in-time" theory which assigned primary
liability to the insurer whose policy first became effective.

The case

of New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Company, 108 F. 2d 653 (6th Cir. 1940) and the case of Air Transp?rtation Manufacturing Company v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporatioc,
91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P. 2d 64 7 (1949) are representative of this view.
It is doubtful that any jurisdiction follows this approach today, since
courts were quick to realize that this particular inquiry was irrelevant
where each policy was in effect at the time the liability arose.
Under the "primary tort feasor" theory courts held the
insurer primarily liable in whose policy the tort feasor was the named
insured.

See: Commercial Casualty Insurance Company v. Hartford

Accident & Indemnity Company, 190 Minn. 528, 252 N. W. 434 (1934); and
American Automobile Insurance Company v. Pennsylvania Mutual
Indemnity Company, 161 F. 2d 62 (3d Cir. 194 7).

More often than not,

this theory has been rejected on the grounds that liability policies are
usually purchased with the intent of covering persons not specifically
named, and because the negligent party frequently is not named in
either policy.

See: Oregon Automobile Insurance Company v. Un~

States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 195 F. 2d 958 (9th Cir. 196 2 ); J.iid
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 444 S. W. 2d 583, 587 (Tex. 1969).
Finally, what was commonly referred to as the "Pennsylvania
rule" and more particularly as the "specific-general coverage" theory
which determined the primary insurer on the basis of which policy provided more specific coverage of the insured's loss.
also been rejected on numerous occasions.

This theory has

See: Oregon Automobile

Insurance Company v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company,
supra; Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Employers Insurance
Company, 45 Cal. App. 2d 288, 114 P. 2d 34 (1941); Employers Liability
Assurance Corporation v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d
188, 227 P. 2d 53 (1951); Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance
Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra; Union Insurance
Company v. Iowa Hardware Mutual Insurance Company, 1 75 N. W. 2d
413, 417 (Iowa 1970); and Continental Casualty Company v. Suttenfield,
236 F. Zd 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1956).

Nevertheless, a majority and

mino'rity position have emerged with regard to the determination of
the relative liability of two insurance companies providing concurrent
coverage for the same loss.

It is our position that the recent trend

favoring the minority rule is indicative of the better view.

But, in any

event, appellant is entitled to recover under either theory.
According to the majority view, . the relative liability of
insuters is determined on a primary and secondary basis through a
'·'" 0
1

f ·,

-'ction o1 the "other insurance" clauses.

1

The basic premise of

0

h ··.iajority rule is that conflicting "other insurance" clauses are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amenable to the usual rules of interpretation of insurance contracts
for detenni.ning the intention of the parties.

The case most often

cited in support of the majority view is Zurich General Accident &
Liability Insurance Company v. Clamor, 124 F. 2d 717 (7th Cir, 1941.
In short, the majority view rests ultimately on the language of the
"other insurance" provision and reconciliation of any conflict which
may exist is subject to the draftsmanship of the various insurance

provisions.
Under the minority view, courts have held that where
concurrent insurance policies carry like "other insurance" clauses
they are mutually repugnant and should be dis regarded.

Apportion-

ment is to be prorated with regard both to damages and to the expense
of defending the lawsuit.

The leading representative of the minority

view is Oregon Autemobile Insurance Company v. United States Fide_li_!:
& Guaranty Company, 195 F. 2d 958 (9th Cir. 196 2).

In that case, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with conflicting excess and
escape clauses on two automobile insurance policies.

The insurer

whose policy contained the escape clause appealed from a judgment
assigning primary liability to it.

The basis of the lower court decisioi

was that the insurance policy containing the excess clause constituted
"other insurance" to effectuate the escape clause.

The Circuit Court

reversed that decision and held that liability should be prorated arnonl
the insurers thereby specifically rejecting the majority view as a
means to reconcile concurrent liability.

At one point, the court st'''
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In our opinion the "other insurance" provisions
of the two policies are indistinguishable in
meaning and intent. One cannot rationally
choose between them• • • • Here, where
both policies carry like "other insurance"
provisions, we think they must be held mutually
repugnant and hence be disregarded. Our conclusion is that such view affords the only
rational solution of the dispute in this case.
The proration is to be applied in respect both
of damages and of the expense of defending the
suits. (at 960)

The minority position rejects the theory that "other
insurance" clauses are reconcilable through interpretation.

In the

case of Union Insurance Company v. Iowa Hardward Mutual Insurance
Company, supra, the court stated that attempting to reconcil conflicting clauses, by attempting to assign primary and secondary liability
on the basis of the language of the provisions, was "at best a pseudosolution in that it only aggravates a circular riddle.

11

In another recent case involving conflicting "other insurance"
provisions of two automobile insurance policies, the court in Allstate
~surance Company v. American Underwriters, Inc., supra, rejected

the majority view and adopted the minority position stating:
Cases of this type cannot be resolved either
by a literal reading of the language used or by
an inquiry into intent.

And the only way to effectuate the intent of
both companies would be by holding neither
liable--a result which would obviously be
contrary to public policy. Under the circumstances, the only fair solution, and the one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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which this court believes would be adopted
by the Indiana courts, is to find the excess
clause and the escape clause mutually
repugnant, and to require the two insurers
to share the loss in proportion to the limits
of their respective policies. (at 1388)

Two recent Law Review articles have outlined the advantages of the minority view.

See:

20 Hastings Law Journal, 1292, 1304

(1969) Conflicts Between "Other Insurance" Clauses in Automobile
Liability Insurance Policies; and 1971 Indiana Law Journal, 270-2,85,
Resolution of Conflicting "Other Insurance" Clauses: New Developments
in Indiana.

At various times, the following have been cited as advantages

of the minority position:

(1) It avoids circular reasoning, depending as

it were, on which policy one happens to read first; (2) it avoids the
difficulty of searching for the intent of insurers through a construction
of the clauses when they are but "fortuitous adversaries" with no privity
of contract existing between them; (3) it recognizes the self-evident
fact that the intentions of both the insurers are, in fact, to reduce or
eliminate liability in this instance; (4) arguably, under the majority
view, the rights of the insured become badly obscured, if not defeated,
by the contractual contest engaged in by casualty insurers; (5) the
majority view encourages the continuing battle of draftsmanship of
still more specific policy terms; (6) the minority view does not arbitrarily pick one of the conflicting clauses and give effect to it; (7) it
does not deprive the insured of any coverage; (8) it is not prejudicial
in giving a windfall to one insurer at the expense of another; (9) it rlu,
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not encourage litigation between insurers; (10) it does not delay settlements; (11) it does enable underwriters to predict the losses of the
insure rs mo re accurately; (12) it does preclude the use of illogical
rules developed by the various courts (e.g., first in time, specific v.
general and primary tort feasor doctrines); (13) and it does give a
basis for uniformity of result; (14) in addition, prorating the loss
among all insurers is a rule that can be applied regardless of the
number of insurers involved and regardless of the type of conflicts
that are created by the "other insurance" clauses; and (15) finally,
the rule is simplier, more convenient and easier to apply than the
majority rule.

The philosophy underlying the minority rule is best

articulated in the case of Fireman's Insurance Company v. St. Paul
Fire &: Marine Insurance Company, 243 Ore. 10, 411 P. 2d 271, 274
(1966) wherein it states:

This court believes it is good public policy
not to put an insured plaintiff, or a defendant
who is fortunate enough to have duplicate
coverage, in a position where there is any
possibility one insurer can say, "After you,
my dear Alphonse!" while the other says,
"Oh, no, after you, my dear Gaston. 11 They
must walk arm in arm through the door of
responsibility.

In Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah2d 157, 417 P. 2d 658 (1966)
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the majority rule, as described, with
regard to the construction of "other insurance" provisions of uninsured
motorist automobile coverage.
"nd 'r>ro

rata" clauses.

That case involved

conflicting "excess"

Specifically, the court stated:
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Where there is a conflict between a pro
rata and an excess "other insurance" clause,
a majority of the courts have imposed primary liability on the pro rata insurer and
hold the excess insurer responsible only for
secondary coverage of the loss,

****
Plaintiff urges this court to adopt a minority
view that the "other insurance" provisions
are mutually repugnant because there is no
rational basis to find United has primary
liability and therefore each company should
pay a pro rata share of the judgment up to
the limits of the policies. This is evidently
the view adopted by the lower court.

****
• [W]e are constrained to adopt the
majority rule which imposes primary liability on the pro rata insurer and secondary
liability on the excess insurer. (at 660-661)

Justice Crockett in a concurring opinion noted the following:
It is my opinion that if there is in fact multiple coverage, it would generally be fair and
equitable to require the insurance companies
to share the loss as provided in the pro rata
clauses • • • • The fundamental questions to
be determined are whether the claimant is
cove red, and whether the re is in fact multiple
coverage. If there is, I would reject tortuous
and specious rationalizations on the basis of
priority in time, more specificness as to
vehicle or individual, or as to primary tortfeasor, and make an equitable apportionment
of the loss. (at 663)
A year later in the case of Prudential Federal Sa~'Loan Association v. St. Paul Insurance Companies, 20 Utah Zd
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q;

P. Zd 602 (1967), this court apparently adopted the archaic, and
generally dis regarded, rule commonly known as the "SpecificGeneral Coverage" theory which determines the primary insurer on
the basis of which policy provided more specific coverage of the
insured 1 s loss.

The court described the fact situation as follows:
• • • One Rowley was a loan officer for
Prudential. Hw owned and sold to Parker
in 1962 realty on a contract. He (Rowley)
had given First Federal a first mortgage
on this realty of some $14, 000. In December
of 1962 Parker applied to Prudential for a
mortgage loan of $16, 300, to be secured by
a first lien on this realty purchased from
Rowley, Prudential obtained from Security
Title a Preliminary Title Report showing
the mortgage to First Federal and advising
Prudential a title policy for $16,300 would
be issued on vesting of Prudential's interest.
Prudential later loaned Parker $16, 300, and
Rowley took $14, 600 to liquidate his contract
with Parker and the balance was paid to
Prudential to cover loan cos ts. Prudential's
Trust Deed was dated December 26, 1962.
The first mortgage to First Federal was
not discharged, hence it retained its first
lien. In 1965, Prudential discovered Rowley
had embezzled sizeable sums over past years
and learned for the first time that First
Federal held a first mortgage on the Parker
property. This, doubtless, prompted the
instant case.
(at 602-603)

Basically, Prudential contended that Rowley's peculations were the sole and proximate cause of their loss of the first lien
on the Parker property.

the

tit!:

insurance was primary liable, because Prudential's claim

lin11tc:d

..

On the other hand, St. Paul argued that

to the lack of a first lien, and it was this deprivation that
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constituted the primary responsibility of the title insurance policy.
This court concurred with the latter and ruled in pertinent part that:
The rule having wide applicability provides that where a blanket policy contains
a provision limiting its liability to an
excess over specific insurance, the
blanket policy must respond, only if the
specific fails to satisfy the loss. (at 603)

Applying the same rule, Justice Tuckett in his dissenting
opinion would have ruled that the St. Paul policy was primary. He
states:
It appears to me that the loss we are here
concerned with stenrmed directly from
Rowley's peculation and that this specific
risk was covered by St. Paul's policy. St.
Paul, having insured the specific risk,
became obligated to pay plaintiff's loss to
the extent of its policy and the title insurance
policy should be treated a general insurance
covering only a general risk of loss to the
plaintiff by reason of a title defect that can
only be resorted to in the event that the
specific coverage is exhausted. (at 604)

Chief Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion noted the
inherent difficulties with the rule adopted by the majority and stated
his objections as follows:
• • • This, for me, emphasizes the
desirability of the practical solution which
I suggest would be fair and equitable: that
where two insurance policies would each
cover the same loss, that is, where either
of them would have to pay the loss if the other
did not exist, they should each pay their
equitable share of the loss.
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• • And there are other problems encountered
in attempting to determine which of two insurers covering the same loss should be held
liable. One is that a specific coverage is
usually held accountable ahead of a general
coverage. The argument proceeds thus: that
since it was the first mortgage protection that
was lost, this was specifically covered by
title insurance policy, and that company should
pay. Opposed to this is the argument that the
foundational cause of the loss was the embezzlement by Rowley, which is specifically covered
by St. Paul, wherefore, the latter should pay.
And so we are led through circuitous rationalizations in an effort to fix liability on one insurer
and to exclude the other, and are urged to see
the answer to this problem as either black or
white, in an area which, to me, is grey.
For the reasons above stated, in my opinion
it would be more fair and realistic to rule
that where there are two or more insurance
coverages, each of which would be liable for
a loss except for the existence of coverage by
the other, each should bear its fair share of
the loss. This would normally mean that if
the loss is within their policy limits, they
should share equally in paying it.
(at
605)
In the case of National Farmers Union Property and
Casualty Company v. Farmers Insurance Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377
P, 2d 786 (1963) and in the case of Christensen v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange, 21 Utah Zd 194, 443 P. 2d 385 (1968), this court also dealt
summarily with this issue, not discussing it in length, holding that,
iii

the context of automobile insurance, the insurance of the owner of

•:p ,ll,li,u,nol)lle is presumed to be primary and the insurance of the non'.':lier

driver of the automobile is presumed to be secondary where
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there is concurrent coverage and a conflict between the two policies,
Because we are dealing with a different variety of insurance policies
(comprehensive automobile liability policy and homeowners policy)
and different fact situations, neither of the two above-mentioned
owner-driver automobile cases nor presumptions stated therein are
particularly helpful.
Applying the minority rule to the facts of this case, the
pro rata "other insurance" clause of Brent G. Story's homeowners
policy with respondent and the primary-pro rata "other insurance"
clause of Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse's comprehensive
automobile liability policy with appellant are mutually repugnant and
should be disregarded, and the court should order an equitable
apportionment of the loss on a pro rata basis.

That appears to be

the only equitable result where there is multiple coverage and each
would be responsible for the loss but for the e:xistence of coverage by
the other,
Applying the majority rule to the facts of this case,
apportionment of the loss should still be made on a pro rata basis.
The "other insurance" clause of Brent G. Story's homeowners policy
with respondent provides that respondent shall not be liable for a
greater proportion of any loss than the amount thereby insured shall
bear to the whole insurance covering the property against the peril
involved, whether collectible or not.

Essentially, it is a pure pro

rata provision as compared to an escape, excess, escape-excess, pro
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rata-escape, pro rata-excess, etc., type provision.

In other words,

it is the intent of the policy to provide primary insurance with a pro

rata qualification if there is other insurance covering the peril,
whether collectible or not.
Looking to the language of the "other insurance" provision
of Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse's insurance policy with
appellant, it states in substance that:

(1)

The insurance policy pro-

vides primary insurance; (2) when the insurance is primary and the
insured has other insurance which is stated to be applicable to the loss
on an excess or contingent basis, the amount of the company's liability
under said policy shall not be reduced by the existence of such other
insurance; and (3) when this insurance and other insurance apply to the
loss on the same basis the company shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability of all valid
and collectible insurance against such loss.

The intent being that the

insurance be primary, but if there is other applicable insurance which
appli'es on the same basis and doesn't apply on a contingency or excess
basis, then the loss should be sustained proportionately.
Returning again to the language of respondent's "other
insurance" clause, it does not state that it applies to the loss on an
excess or contingent basis.

It does not state that it provides excess

insurance only should there be concurrent coverage by a specific policy.
The p-resumption should be, based upon the silence of the draftsman where
: .• ,

!~_,rl thee opportunity to speak, that the insurance is primary.

Because
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after looking at the language of the insurance contracts, interpreting
and construing said contracts, multiple coverage exists on the same
basis, the court should honor the contracts as written and apportion
the loss on a pro rata basis.

Within the context of the majority rule,

we are wont to agree with the court in Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. St. Paul Insurance Companies, at 603, where it
states:
The rule having wide applicability provides that where a blanket policy contains
a provision limiting its liability to an
excess over specific insurance, the blanket
policy must respond, only if the specific
fails to satisfy the loss. • • •

In this case, respondent's homeowners insurance policy
does not contain a provision limiting its liability to an excess over
specific insurance.
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that based upon both
the majority and minority rule, appellant is entitled to recover from
respondent its proportionate share of the loss sustained.
POINT II
A SPECIFIC INSURANCE POLICY IS NOT PRIMARY
INSURANCE AND A GENERAL INSURANCE POLICY
IS NOT EXCESS INSURANCE BY MERE REASON OF
FACT THAT LOSS COMES WITffiN COVERAGE OF
BOTH POLICIES, ONE BEING DESIGNED
SPECIFICALLY FOR LOSS SUSTAINED AND THE
OTHER BEING A GENERAL POLICY WffiCH
INCLUDES PARTICULAR LOSS WITIDN ITS SCOPE

Although initially courts dealing with the problem oi
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concurrent insurance coverage used the "specific-general coverage"
theory to determine the primary insurer on the basis of which policy
provided more specific coverage of the insured's loss, today that
theory is generally disregarded.

With respect thereto, the traditional

rule is stated in Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 62:42, Proration
between general and specific policies:
The fact that a loss comes within the coverage of two policies, one being designed
specifically for the loss sustained and the
other being a general policy which includes
the particular loss within its scope, does
not make the specific policy primary insurance
and the general policy excess insurance.
(at 497)

In the case of American Employers 1 Insurance Company

v. Continental Casualty Company, 85 N.M. 346, 512 P. 2d 674 (1973)
a suit was brought by a comprehensive liability insurer for declaration of its non-liability in respect to defense of insured and counterclaim
by professional liability insurer for indemnification and reimburse-

ment for expenditures made by it in defending and settling the suits
against the insured.

In that case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico

held that a specific policy is not primary insurance and a general
policy is not excess insurance by mere reason of fact that loss comes
within the coverage of both policies, the one being designed specifically
ioi' lhe loss sustained and the other being a blanket policy which in'li~-:l, -- the 1v:i rticular loss.

As has been previously noted, neither the majority rule,
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which looks to the language of the policy to determine the intent of
the parties, nor the minority rule, which holds conflicting clauses
mutually repugnant and prorates the applicable insurance, maintain
that a specific policy is primary insurance and a general policy excess
insurance where the loss comes within the coverage of both policies,
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, appellant seeks to have the
Order granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and
denying appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment set aside, and
further seeks a judgment in its favor and against the respondent.
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